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Abstract
As a combination of online and offline channel
services, multichannel healthcare services currently
play important roles in helping consumers solve their
health problems. In this study, we establish a stylized
model to investigate how healthcare service providers
should price in multi-channels and when consumers
should choose online service, taking misdiagnosis rate
and the severity of disease problems into account. Our
results show that the prices of the online channel and
offline channel can increase when the misdiagnosis rate
is low and minor problem inspection rate online is high.
Moreover, when the diagnosis rate is high, the profit of
online channel would increase, and then improve the
profit of multichannel service. These findings provide
insights for the theoretical research of online healthcare
service and practice management on pricing strategies
in multichannel healthcare services.

1. Introduction
Statistics showed that the number of medical
practitioners in China has steadily increased from 2.08
million in 2008 to 3.39 million in 2017 [17, 26]. In
addition, the number of total treatments has raised from
4.9 billion in 2008 to 8.1 billion in 2017 [9]. These data
imply that the traditional offline healthcare system is
over demand and under tremendous pressure. Therefore,
an imbalance between the large amounts of consumers
and the insufficient amounts of physicians exists. With
the development of information technology, online
healthcare service occurs [27]. As a supplement to
traditional offline hospitals, online healthcare channel is
gradually adopted by consumers [37].
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Multichannel healthcare services involve both
online and offline healthcare service to provide an
additional amount of services than the traditional offline
one [24]. In the traditional offline healthcare service,
consumers first need to queue up for an appointment at
the hospital. Then, physicians have a detailed and
comprehensive knowledge of the consumers’ physical
condition after the face-to-face inquiring and required
physical testing. Finally, physicians provide consumers
further diagnostic solutions or other suggestions.
Therefore, consumers need to spend a substantial
amount of time and energy to receive the offline channel
healthcare service. In addition, the supply quantity of
traditional offline healthcare service is limited by the
number of physicians, because the limited provision of
physicians can only serve a limited number of
consumers in one day.
In the online healthcare service, consumers need not
have to wait in line as generally practiced in offline
hospital. However, owing to the privacy concern of
sharing health information online, consumers may be
reluctant to tell their actual physical state to protect their
privacy [19]. Under this information asymmetry
circumstance, physicians may not know exactly about
the consumer’s actual physical condition, which will
lead to misdiagnosis and ineffective problem solving
[22, 25]. Moreover, in some cases of healthcare
problems, because of unavailable inspection equipment
or technical limitations in the online channel, physicians
cannot provide accurate solutions to consumers’ health
problems online. In these cases, the physicians will
advise consumers that additional offline service can
offer a further accurate diagnosis.
Some of the healthcare service providers still focus
on offering service in traditional offline hospitals,
whereas others may expand service to online channels,
such as online healthcare communities [14].
Considering the differences between the online and
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offline channels in the healthcare service market, we
propose the following research questions:
1. How do service providers set the price of online
and offline channel respectively to maximize the profits
of the multichannel healthcare service market?
2. When do consumers prefer to choose online
channel to seek a healthcare service?
3. How will the profit of online channel affect the
profits of offline channel and multichannel?
From game theory [15, 16, 33] and utility
maximization method [20], we establish a stylized
model to address the issues of resource allocation and
pricing strategies in online and offline channels. In our
model, we not only investigate the multichannel
services in the healthcare industry, but also take the
misdiagnosis rate and the severity of disease problems
into consideration. It also provides management advice
for the healthcare service market.

2. Literature review
2.1. Multichannel healthcare services
The recent growth of multichannel service is
correlated to the booming development of information
technology and e-services [4, 35, 27]. Offline channel
and online channel are the two main ways of
multichannel services. Previous studies have given
different definitions of multichannel. Melis et al. [13]
regarded multichannel as a combination of online stores
and offline shops, which become an overall retailing
mode. Berman and Thelen [2] stated that the integration
between online and offline channels is the multichannel
services, which is used in retail industry. However,
healthcare service is different from retailing production
[20]. According to Melis et al. [13], we define
multichannel as a combination of online and offline
channels, which can coexist in the healthcare service
market.
To manage multichannel retail market, prior studies
have elucidated that a proper multichannel strategy can
increase consumer loyalty [3] and improve profit [29].
In addition, Zhang et al. [11] listed some various key
factors of multichannel retail service strategy, such as
organizational structure, data integration, consumer
analysis, and evaluation to show that how multichannel
retailing evolve over time. Concerning consumers’
behavior in multichannel market, Gao and Su [5]
investigated consumers’ purchasing behavior in both
online and offline channels.
Regarding the healthcare industry, many researchers
focused on the either offline healthcare service [23] or
online healthcare service [14]. For offline healthcare
channel, researchers found that there is a significant

spillover effect between regional offline hospitals [6].
Some studies pointed out that the use of information
technology will influence the quality of healthcare
service [1, 34]. For online healthcare channel,
researchers figured out some driving factors in online
healthcare consultation [18, 28], such as the use of social
media and doctor-patient relationship. Guo et al. [28]
also found that the quantity of online consultation is
related to the comment and degree of expertise as well
as online price. Gradually, researchers began to
investigate the multichannel healthcare service, which
include both online channel and offline channel. Wu and
Lu [7] stated that physicians with high reputation can
strength the relationship between offline hospitals
communication and online channel interaction. Akçura
et al. [21] developed a mathematical model to explore
the impact of online channel on service market,
revealing that high-quality providers cannot offer a
sufficiently high-quality online service. Also, Akçura
and Ozdemir indicated that management strategy of
online and offline service market should be different in
multichannel healthcare service [20]. Previous studies
mainly consider pricing from the perspective of service
providers. Our study explores the impact of consumers'
channel choice on online and offline channel’s pricing
strategies from the perspective of consumers.

2.2 Misdiagnosis
Generally, consumers are concerned about the
quality of healthcare service to solve health problems
effectively. Physicians in traditional offline healthcare
service can know comprehensively about consumers’
physical condition through face-to-face inquiry and
physical examination. While in online healthcare
channel, consumers can share limited information to
physicians via online interaction, such as the discomfort
of body. Therefore, there exist information incomplete
and information asymmetry in the online healthcare
service. And incomplete information or information
asymmetry can lead to physicians' misdiagnosis [8].
Misdiagnosis is the mistakes or inaccuracies of the
physician's diagnosis. Misdiagnosis has an adverse
effect on the quality of healthcare service and makes
consumers’ problems unsolved. Hyndman and Ozerturk
[12] explored the relationship between consumers’
professional knowledge and the probability of being
misdiagnosed in the process of healthcare service. They
found that if physicians cheat the knowledgeable
customers, market efficiency would reduce [12]. Also,
some studies have suggested that searching for a second
opinion, which means having a re-examination, can
significantly reduce misdiagnosis [32].
In online healthcare service, existed studies mainly
investigated the quality of online healthcare service,
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such as consumers’ loyalty [30] and consumers’
satisfaction [36]. Regarding misdiagnosis in online
healthcare service, researchers figured out that
perceived usefulness of using smart healthcare service
may decrease online misdiagnosis [10]. Researchers
found that using artificial intelligence-based medical
diagnosis support system in complex situations online
would improve the accuracy and effectiveness of
physicians’ diagnosis [31]. However, there is few
research on studying the impact of online misdiagnosis
in multichannel healthcare services. Our study takes the
physician’s online misdiagnosis into account to develop
the following model.

3. Model
Healthcare service market consists of consumers,
who face problems, and physicians, who provide
solutions or suggestions to consumers’ problems. The
current study assumes that all consumers know they
have some health problems but are unaware of the exact
nature of their problems. Thus, consumers should
attempt to seek solutions and solve their problems from
either offline or online channels.
The offline channel. Consumers who seek for
offline channel service must visit hospitals. The distance
cost of receiving offline services is 𝜀. When ε is large,
the consumers will perceive the distance cost as
excessively high to go offline. Then physicians
communicate with consumers through face-to-face
inquiry and examine the consumers’ physical condition
so that they can offer solutions to consumers’ health
problems. The marginal cost of serving a consumer in
the offline hospital is c. In light of Akçura and Ozdemir
[20], we assume that ε and c are both distributed
uniformly across [0, 1].
If the price of offline is 𝑝𝑓 , then, the utility of
consumer who seeks and purchases service from the
offline physician is given by:
𝑈𝑓 = 𝑉 − 𝑝𝑓 − 𝜀,
(3.1)
where V is the base valuation. We assume that V is
sufficiently high to allow at least some consumers to
look for service in equilibrium.
The online channel. Face-to-face interactions (i.e.,
offline channel) in a private physician’s office require
consumers to disclose all relevant information and
undergo physical examination for a thorough
knowledge of their health problems. However, in online
channel, physicians will receive less information with
no inspection. In addition, Akçura and Srinivasan [19]
have shown that consumers with privacy concern can
only share limited information with others online. Such
condition may decrease the accuracy of physicians’
diagnosis in the online channel. Thus, we conjecture that

misdiagnosis will result in problems being unsolved in
online channel than in offline healthcare service.
When the physician misdiagnoses, the consumer
will receive an ineffective solution. We assume that
consumers will receive an effective diagnosis, so ℎ
denotes the effective diagnosis rate in the online channel,
where 0 < ℎ < 1 . Accordingly, consumers would
receive a probability 1 − ℎ of misdiagnosis. We
conjecture that the misdiagnosis will result in problems
unsolved. After being misdiagnosed in online channel,
consumers would not believe online channel at all and
consider if they should seek subsequent offline service
or leave the market and relinquish any treatment.
Because of the misdiagnosis, the consumers’ utility of
the online channel will be reduced. Therefore, 𝐾
denotes the utility loss after misdiagnosis.
If the physician diagnoses effectively in the online
channel, the physician will inform the consumer the
nature of the problem and offer the consumer some
suggestions. The diagnosis result will help consumers
estimate the severity degree, whether major or minor.
Major problems refer to more complex and severe
diseases requiring further examination to identify their
exact nature, such as chronic disease, cancer,
cardiovascular disease, and cerebrovascular diseases.
Minor problems are classified as sicknesses that are
obvious and easy to judge and solve, such as influenza,
cough, and diarrhea. Physicians can give further
reasonable treatments to minor problems. However, to
successfully solve consumers’ major problems,
physicians need consumers’ medical history, inspection
results, and several other related information, which
only the offline environment can provide. To
incorporate the severity degree of health problem in the
online channel, we assume that a consumer has a minor
problem online with a probability 𝛼, where 0 < 𝛼 < 1.
When consumers first select the online channel for
healthcare service and obtain the diagnosis result of a
minor problem, the physician will solve the consumer’s
problem. When consumers select the online channel for
healthcare service first and obtain the diagnosis result of
a major problem, they will consider the following
behavioral decision (i.e., visit the offline hospital to test
and solve problems or abandon any offline treatment).
Regardless of the type of healthcare problems is major
or minor, whether major or minor, we regard these
problems would be solved via an offline channel.
If the physician charges the price of the online
channel 𝑝𝑜 , then, the utility of consumer who purchases
the service from the online physician is given by:
𝑈𝑜 = (1 − ℎ)(V − 𝑝𝑜 − K − 𝑝𝑓 − 𝜀) + ℎα(V − 𝑝𝑜 )
+ℎ(1 − α)(V − 𝑝𝑜 − 𝑝𝑓 − 𝜀),
(3.2)
where the first, second, and third terms are for the utility
of receiving misdiagnosis service, the utility of
obtaining the effective service and the diagnosis of a

Page 1087

problem as a minor problem, and the utility of obtaining
the effective service and the diagnosis of a problem as a
major problem, respectively.
Simplifying the formula above, we will obtain:
𝑈𝑜 = (1 − ℎ𝛼)(𝑉 − 𝑝𝑜 − 𝑝𝑓 − 𝜀) + ℎ𝛼𝑉
−𝑝𝑜 − (1 − ℎ)𝐾.
(3.3)
Table 1 details the notation used in this study.
Table 1. Notations and definitions
Notation
Definition
V
The base valuation
𝑝𝑓
Service price of offline channel
𝑝𝑜
Service price of online channel
The marginal cost of serving a
𝑐
consumer in offline channel
𝜀
Distance cost of getting offline service
K
Utility loss after misdiagnosis
Effective diagnosis rate in online
ℎ
channel
Minor problem inspection rate in online
α
diagnosis
𝑈𝑓
The utility of consumers offline
𝑈o
The utility of consumers online
Consumers in the healthcare service market have the
following four options: (1) directly seeking offline
service and solving the problem; (2) choosing online
service first; obtaining offline face-to-face service or
leaving the market once misdiagnosed; (3) if diagnosed
with minor problems, it would be solved via an online
channel; or (4) if diagnosed with major problems, it
would be solved in an offline channel or leave the
market. Figure 1 shows the process and decisions for the
entire service in the market.

4. Analysis
First, the consumer considers whether the initial visit
is offline or online. The consumer who is indifferent
between offline and online channels is located at 𝜀0 .
Solving Equations (3.1) and (3.3) for 𝜀0 , we have:
𝑝 +(1−ℎ)𝐾
𝜀0 = 𝑜
− 𝑝𝑓 .
(3.4)
ℎ𝛼
Second, if the consumer lives far away from the
offline hospital, he would prefer online service because
of the high transportation cost. However, when facing
an ineffective service or a major problem, the consumer
must consider the utility of the offline channel. The
consumer, who lives farther away:
𝜀1 = 𝑉 − 𝑝𝑓 ,
(3.5)
will find it too costly to seek an offline service, so he
will leave the market without any solutions. The
consumer who lives closer than 𝜀1 will prefer offline
service to solve their problems.
Thus, the profit function for the service provider is:
Π = 𝜀0 (𝑝𝑓 − 𝑐) + (1 − 𝜀0 )𝑝0
+(1 − ℎα)(𝜀1 − 𝜀0 )(𝑝𝑓 − 𝑐),
(3.6)
where the first, second, and third terms are for the profits
from offline (i.e., first) service, online service, and
offline (i.e., second) service, respectively.
Further simplifying the above equations, we thus
have:
Π = 𝜀0 (𝑝𝑓 − 𝑐) + (1 − 𝜀0 )𝑝0
+(1 − ℎα)(𝜀1 − 𝜀0 )(𝑝𝑓 − 𝑐).
(3.7)
Derivatives of 𝑝𝑜 and 𝑝𝑓 are obtained respectively
from Formula (3.7). We can obtain the following
optimal equilibrium prices of the online channel and
offline channel:

Consumers

Physicians

Physicians

Consumers

First options

Solutions

Problem
classification

Second options

First Offline
Channel

Solved the problems

−

Misdiagnosed
(ineffective)

Second offline
channel or leave

Online
Channel
Minor problem

Solved the problems

Major problem

Second offline
channel or leave

①

②

③

Diagnosed
(effective)
−

④

Figure 1. The process and decisions for the entire service in the market
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𝑝𝑜∗ =

ℎ𝛼𝑉−(1−ℎ)𝐾

𝑝𝑓∗ =

𝑉+𝑐

+

2
ℎ𝛼

+

2

ℎ𝛼

.

(3.8)

2(1−ℎ𝛼)

.

(3.9)

2(1−ℎ𝛼)
𝑝𝑜∗ and 𝑝𝑓∗

Proposition 1.
increase with the increase in
α and ℎ, respectively.
When α or ℎ are higher, both the online and offline
prices are higher. When some minor problems become
prevalent, more consumers can obtain a solution online;
then, the online channel will gain additional trust from
consumers. Therefore, service providers can raise the
price of the online channel to make extra money. When
physicians attain an accurate diagnosis, customers will
trust the online channel and purchase healthcare service
more from online; thus, the price of the online channel
increases.
By substituting 𝑝𝑜∗ and 𝑝𝑓∗ for Equations (3.4) and
(3.5), we can obtain 𝜀0 and 𝜀1 . Furthermore, we will
obtain the demand of offline market and online market
and ultimately the unresolved demand.
Online demand:
ℎ𝛼(1+𝑐)−(1−ℎ)𝐾
ℎ𝛼(1 − 𝜀0 ) =
.
(3.10)
2
Totally offline demand:
(1−ℎ𝛼)𝑉+(1−ℎ)𝐾−𝑐
𝜀1 − ℎ𝛼(𝜀1 − 𝜀0 ) =
.
(3.11)
2
Unsolved demand:
ℎ𝛼+(1−ℎ𝛼)(𝑣−𝑐)
(1 − ℎ𝛼)(1 − 𝜀0 ) = 1 −
.
(3.12)
2

K

Proposition 2. When

K+α(1+c)

< h < 1 , consumers

will choose the online channel.
In this case, service providers should raise the offline
price to obtain sufficient profit. Thus, misdiagnosis
should not be too high, otherwise, consumers will not
choose an online channel.
According to the optimal pricing, we can also have
the profit via online and offline channels.
Overall profit:
1
Π ∗ = [(𝑣 − 𝑐)2 (ℎ𝛼𝑉 − 𝐾 + ℎ𝐾)(2 − 𝑉 + 2𝑐) −
4

(𝑣 − 𝑐)2 (ℎ𝛼𝑉 − 𝐾 + ℎ𝐾)
Online profit:
Π𝑜∗ = (1 − 𝜀0 )𝑝0
=(

1+𝑐
2

−

(1−ℎ)𝐾
ℎ𝛼

)[

𝐾−ℎ𝐾
ℎ𝛼

ℎ𝛼𝑉−(1−ℎ)𝐾
2

+

+

ℎ𝛼
1−ℎ𝛼

ℎ𝛼

]. (3.13)

]. (3.14)

2(1−ℎ𝛼)

Offline profit:
Π𝑓∗ = 𝜀0 (𝑝𝑓 − 𝑐) + (1 − ℎα)(𝜀1 − 𝜀0 )(𝑝𝑓 − 𝑐)
=(

1−𝑐

+

(1−ℎ)𝐾

ℎ𝛼
2

2
𝑉−1

[

2

[

−

𝑉−𝑐

)[

2
ℎ𝛼
(𝑉−𝑐)(1−ℎ𝛼) 𝑉−1
2
ℎ𝛼

2

−

2(1−ℎ𝛼)

+

ℎ𝛼

]+

2(1−ℎ𝛼)
(1−ℎ)𝐾
ℎ𝛼

−

2(1−ℎ𝛼)
(1−ℎ)𝐾

−

ℎ𝛼

].

ℎ𝛼

]+
(3.15)

Proposition 3. As ℎ increases, online profits increase,
offline profits decrease, and overall profits increase.
As the accuracy of the diagnosis increases, the
online channel gains additional customers, and fewer
customers will choose the offline channel. Therefore,

the profit of the online channel will rise, and the profit
of the offline channel will decrease. For the entire
market, because the allocation of resources is effective,
the profits of the entire market will increase, thereby
improving social welfare.

5. Discussion
5.1 Interpretation of findings
In this study, we investigate the impact of
misdiagnosis rate and the severity of the health
problems on the multichannel healthcare service market.
Then we obtain the following conclusions.
First, service providers must raise their price in online
and offline channels according to effective diagnosis
rate and the probability of minor problems. The
effective diagnosis rate and the probability of minor
problems also positively affect the optimal pricing of
both online and offline channels. Second, when the rate
of online misdiagnosis under a certain degree,
consumers will prefer the online channel. Third, when
the misdiagnosis rate is low, the online channel will
attract other consumers, which results in the high profit
of online channel and low profit of the online channel.
However, under this circumstance, the entire
multichannel profit increases. Thus, providing online
channel service and alleviating offline treatment
pressure are beneficial for multichannel service
providers.

5.2 Implications for research
The results of this study have the potential to make
several contributions to research. First, we think that this
study covers the shortage of multichannel service in the
healthcare industry. Although literature exists about
multichannel services in retail industry [5], service
industry, such as multichannel healthcare services,
remains lacking.
Second, the study of the misdiagnosis rate of the
online channel is relatively new to supply chain research.
Despite some studies on the relationship between
misdiagnosis and customer satisfaction [36], only a few
studies have considered the impact of misdiagnosis on
pricing strategy in the multichannel market.
Third, this study provides insights into the effect of
different kinds of situations on users’ channel
preferences. We find that minor problem inspection rate
has a significant positive effect on customers’ choice of
the online channel.

5.3 Implications for practice
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In practice, we put forward some management
suggestions from three aspects. First, for the
government, we propose that the government should
strengthen the control of healthcare industry and pay
attention to the quality of online healthcare service to
reduce the probability of misdiagnosis so that other
customers’ problems can find effective solutions
through online and offline channels. Second, for the
healthcare industry, we suggest that service providers
can increase the investment to develop information
technology, which can improve the quality of online
healthcare service and reduce the pressure of excessive
demand for offline healthcare service. Through the
effective and rational allocation of resources, additional
profits can be obtained. Third, for consumers, when the
minor problems are prevalent, online service can help
cut down on expenditure, save time, and improve
service efficiency. We suggest that consumers who can
solve minor problems at a lower cost should access the
online channel instead of the offline channel, whereas
consumers who must solve major problems at a higher
cost can directly access the offline channel.

5.4 Limitations and future research
Overall, this study settles the question of how to
manage multi-channel to allocate healthcare service
resources rationally, which is conducive to multichannel
operation and sustainable development of resources.
However, some limitations are identified in in our study.
First, we only consider dividing the disease into size
problems and less on detailed problems. Different types
of problems have different treatment methods. For
example, chronic disease may require repeatedly online
inquiries and long-term inspection, which will be a
process of multiple decision making. Second, we did not
consider the impact of healthcare conditions in different
regions on the quality of service. For example, in
relatively poor areas, the offline channel may not solve
the problem, but online channel may have higher service.
Third, we only consider the general situation without
differentiating the effect of various cultures. Future
research can consider cultural factors.
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